| | Michael Moeller wsrote, "Sorry, but it is difficult for me to continue, mostly because I have exams in a week. But secondly, I am frustrated by what I think are obvious points."
I feel your frustration, Michael. ;-)
You continue, "As far as I can see, the only thing 'circular' are the hoops you are jumping through to make 'deterrence' the primary goal."
I'm not sure what you mean by "primary" here. I've already indicated that I don't think deterrence should supersede individual rights, which would presumably be violated by cruel and unusual punishment. But deterrence is, as far as I can see, the only justification for punishment that we have a right to administer. I'm sure you disagree with this, but I'm still not clear on your rationale for punishing rights-violators. I know it's not retribution, nor is it deterrence. So what is it? What do you hope to accomplish by punishing a rights-violator?
You write, "Also, I would suggest getting ahold of Robert Bidinotto's article on this topic, I think it is significantly better than Peikoff's tape."
Okay, perhaps you could direct me to a source. Better yet, perhaps you could summarize RB's position, since you are so impressed with it.
You continued, "Which brings me to another point, please recognize differences [between] consequentialism in law and consequences in action. Most definitely do NOT put AR or LP and the former category."
I never did.
You write, "If you have heard AR's tape on "Objective Law", you would see she most definitely rejects this. To be more specific, she speaks about the complete non-objectivity of "preventative laws", another favorite of the utilitarians (and it seems you as well)."
Interesting! I wonder what she means by "preventative laws." Not wanting to wait for the tape, although I am interested in hearing it, I did an online search, and this is what I found on the ARI website regarding preventive law. According to Gary Hull: "The FDA operates on the dictatorial premise of 'preventive law.' The agency assumes that pharmaceutical companies are guilty of poisoning the public until their innocence can be proved. Objective law, a cornerstone of the Bill of Rights, rests on the individual's right to be free of government coercion unless there is evidence that he has committed a crime; preventive law cavalierly violates that right by subjecting people to government force without any such evidence."
If this is what Ayn Rand means by "preventive law," then it has nothing whatever to do with our discussion. Frankly, I'm astonished that you don't recognize the difference between what Hull is saying and what I'm saying.
You write, "And NO, Bill, I am not putting you in the category with the other utilitarians, I am just pointing out what is down the road and that they, in fact, are more consistent. You are trying to salvage with an appeal to an individual right system, it can't be done when you take the focus off the individual actors."
Michael, you've said this before, and I still have no idea what you're talking about. What do you mean when you say that I "take the focus off the individual actors." If you explain anything to me, please explain this.
You write, "Let me try with a couple of last scenarios to see if this improves anything. Say, for instance, your best friend or your wife were coming out of a store and some thug came up to them, stabbed them in the neck, and took off with all their money. Now, if you knew that punishing him would have NO deterrent effect--it would not deter one criminal from committing one crime--would you punish him? Since there is no deterrent effect, do you see any reason to punish the criminal or would you let them continue to roam the streets like any other citizen?"
If punishing this person had no deterrent effect on him or on anyone else--which is a big "IF," to be sure--then I don't see any point in punishing him. What would be accomplished by it? Although I would certainly feel a strong desire to retaliate--to seek vengeance against him--that desire is not itself a sufficient justification for punishing him, which in any case should be a dispassionate process that is undertaken for the sake of a rational end or goal. What could that end or goal possibly be, if not protection or deterrence?
You continue, "Another mistake you make, very common to most utilitarians, is to treat criminals as the 'economic man' where they sit down and perform a cost/benefit analysis on committing this crime or that crime and weight it against the punishment. I hate to tell you this, Bill, but a 30-year sentence for petty theft will not necessarily turn a thief into a murderer."
No, but if the penalty for murder is also 30 years, then a 30-year sentence for petty theft could induce a petty thief to commit a murder in order to avoid being apprehended. What would he have to lose? Absolutely nothing. Since he would get 30-years in either case, why not commit the murder if it could lessen his chances of being identified and apprehended?
You continue, "You are working off of a faulty assumption that I do not think is supported by crime rate statistics. But it does bring me to a 2nd question: if it was proven that cutting off a hand did reduce theft crimes and there was NO increase in other more violent crimes, would you favor it? In other words, this heavier sentencing has a greater deterrent effect on that specific crime with no effects on other crimes, would you advocate it?
No, because I would classify it as cruel and unusual punishment, which would be tantamount to a rights violation. But I would say that it is unrealistic to think that cutting off a thief's hand would not increase other violent crimes. If I were a thief and knew that if I were apprehended my hand would be cut off, I would almost certainly be willing to commit a more serious crime in order to avoid that kind of mutilation.
You continue, "If not the cutting off of a hand, how about a 30-year sentence in prison under the same scenario (if you don't like the physical brutality of it, even though it fits the deterrence theory)?"
No, I wouldn't agree that a thief should get a 30-year sentence for petty theft, for the reasons already given. It could increase the likelihood of other more serious crimes. But your question is: would I advocate it if it didn't? No, because insofar as the punishment were excessive relative to the crime, it would again be tantamount to a rights violation.
You write, "Last question: how do you make a rape victim or murder victim "whole" again?"
I'm not sure about a rape victim, but it's obvious that you can't make a murder victim whole, because you can't bring him back to life, but why are you asking me that kind of question? When did I ever say that a rape or murder victim could be made whole? I think you may be confusing me with someone else.
You continue, "I want to repeat one thing I wrote to Jordan, I am not against 'restitution' per se. I think it is fine if a criminal works to pay some measure of damages as part of an overall punishment, but one that is based on incarceration."
Okay, fine. And you thought that I would disagree with this because...?
- Bill
|
|
